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On the Critical Edition of The Letters of George Santayana 
In October 1952 began the effort to collect and publish letters written by American 
philosopher, poet, playwright, novelist, and critic George Santayana. Santayana’s publisher 
wrote a letter to Daniel Cory, the longtime assistant of Santayana, suggesting he edit a volume of 
Santayana’s correspondence. Santayana had died the previous month, and Cory was now the 
executor of Santayana's literary estate. By 1954 Cory had collected around a thousand letters. 
About one third of those were published the next year in a single volume entitled The Letters of 
George Santayana (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955).  
Fifteen years later, in 1970, Cory contacted Bucknell University English professor and 
editor of The Complete Poems of George Santayana (Bucknell U. Press, 1979) William G. Holzberger 
with plans to produce a more complete version of the letters. Holzberger agreed to help Cory 
locate and edit additional letters, but two years into this project Cory died of a heart attack. 
Holzberger continued the work, and in 1977 he joined the Santayana Edition, the newly-
established project led by Herman J. Saatkamp Jr and dedicated to producing a critical edition of 
all of Santayana's writings. Holzberger became the Textual Editor, and he and Saatkamp 
became co-editors of the Letters. The eight books of the Letters became Volume IV of The Works of 
George Santayana.  
By the time publication of the Letters began in 2001, over 3000 letters written by 
Santayana had been located—three times as many as Cory originally had found. Several letters 
are known to have been lost; for example Santayana himself destroyed his letters to his mother 
and few letters remain documenting the friendship of Santayana and John Francis Stanley, 
second earl Russell, which was perhaps the most intense personal relationship in which 
Santayana ever involved himself. Furthermore, It is almost certain that not all existing letters 
have been found. Most recently a short letter from Santayana in response to an autograph seeker 
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was found for sale on eBay for $499. The listing remains open as of last week, and the Santayana 
Edition has retained, with permission of the owner, a copy of the letter for a file of those found 
after publication.  
In a project of this nature and duration there are of course many people who have made 
substantial contributions. In addition to those already named I should acknowledge Margot 
Cory, Daniel's widow who became Santayana's literary executor. She supported the work not 
only by granting permission but also by transcribing letters for the Edition. Annegret Holzberger 
also aided the Edition by working as an editorial assistant for the Edition almost from the 
beginning. She has continued to help with proofreading and composing footnotes for volumes 
beyond the letters. 
The Santayana Edition began at the University of Tampa and moved to Texas A&M 
University before coming to IUPUI in 1999. Along the way there were many librarians, 
archivists, clerical staff, and graduate and undergraduate students who helped with locating, 
transcribing, and proofreading letters. Perhaps the greatest acknowledgments are owed to the 
professional editing staff of the Santayana Edition. At Texas A&M Donna Hanna-Calvert and 
Brenda Bridges performed much detective and editorial work that made it possible for the 
Edition to publish on average a book of letters every year since 2001. Though Ms. Bridges 
remained in Texas she remains an interested supporter of the work of the Edition. 
Credit for the achievement of getting the eight books of letters to the publishers and in the 
hands of readers belongs to several people at IUPUI including Consulting Editor and Professor 
Emeritus in the Department of Philosophy Paul Nagy, Assistant Editor Johanna Resler, Assistant 
Textual Editor David Spiech, and Director and Editor Marianne Wokeck. Ms. Resler's thorough 
indexes reveal to researchers the treasures of the Letters, and Mr. Spiech's astute editing and well-
researched footnotes help bolster the textual apparatus of this edition. Dean Wokeck's 
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documentary editing expertise, administrative skill, and leadership have maintained the strength 
of the project through almost a decade of changes including the shift from editing letters to 
editing philosophical texts, a second move to new offices, and the adoption of new software and 
related technologies. 
The person most responsible for the consistent quality of the publications, the steady 
productivity of the Edition, and the congenial environment of the Edition offices is the Assistant 
Director and Associate Editor of the Santayana Edition Kristine Frost. She has been with the 
Edition for over twenty years and was in the thick of tracking and transcribing letters. She joined 
the Edition at Texas A&M and is undeniably and without a doubt key to the success of the 
Edition at IUPUI.  
But now you may be wondering what exactly has been successful, and what is it that is 
worth this more-than-50-year-long effort. One response might mention the correspondents to 
whom Santayana wrote. In addition to friends, immediate and extended family, and admirers, 
recipients include philosophers such as William James, Josiah Royce, John Dewey, Bertrand 
Russell, and Sidney Hook; and literary figures such as Gertrude Stein, Logan Pearsall Smith, 
R(obert) C(alverley) Trevelyan, Upton Sinclair, Max Eastman, Clifton Fadiman, Miguel de 
Unamuno, Ezra Pound, and Robert Lowell. There are also letters to faculty members, students, 
and administrators at Harvard where Santayana studied philosophy and then taught for 20 
years. But any justification this could offer is secondary, and the primary questions may lie closer 
to the ones put to me last summer by someone unfamiliar with the work of the Edition: Why 
Santayana? Why now? 
I answer that Santayana’s work offers a philosophical vision of human values without 
superstition. This vision reveres truth with courage and sincerity. These values diverge from—
without condemning—the love of celebrity, possessions, and power prominent in popular 
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alternative visions of human life. Santayana's prized values arise from the potentials and 
capacities of human reason and spiritual life, and his understanding of human spiritual capacities 
is always rooted in nature, in the larger universe. Hence, Santayana’s vision is broad but not 
shallow and human but not anthropomorphic. Accordingly, he conceived of science without 
arrogance; religion without fundamentalism; pluralism without coercion; and disillusion without 
nihilism.  
Santayana wrote to one correspondent "you know my philosophy has always been that 
disillusion is the only safe foundation for happiness" (To Mary Williams Winslow, 4 November 
1915), and the theme runs throughout his writing including his early letters. For example it 
appears in letters on religion to a college classmate, Henry Ward Abbot with whom Santayana 
carried on an energetic correspondence while studying abroad for two years following 
graduation. Santayana chides his friend for his simplistic dismissal of religion and points out the 
dogmatism of his friend that has become yet another illusion: 
Your last letter, like all the others, interests me exceedingly, although I 
confess your view of Catholicism and orthodoxy in general is pitiful. Allow me to 
tell you that you don’t know what you are talking about. I say this simply because 
it is what I think, and not because I am angry or provoked, and I will let the 
matter rest, without attempting to explain to you why religion is fit for other 
people besides whores and servant girls. I am sure that you say this absurdity 
impulsively and that you wouldn’t maintain it in the face of history and daily 
experience. Yet I can’t let you tell me things of that sort without protesting against 
them as vigorously as possible. I like myself to ridicule religion. There is nothing in 
the world which seems to me to be without absurdity of some sort in it, and I see 
no reason why we should not enjoy the ludicrous wherever we see it as much as 
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we enjoy the beautiful. We are surely exercising a faculty on its appropriate 
object. But when you deny to religion the right to awaken any other feeling but 
that of scorn, you are depriving yourself of some of your noblest faculties, by 
depriving them of their only object. And what is worse, you are insulting those 
better equipped mortals who possess the religious organ, which you call an 
excrescence because you don’t know how to use it. Pray try to look at the matter 
otherwise. . . . 
. . . if you expect me to cure you of pessimism you have struck the wrong 
man. “Eat, drink, and die” is precisely my motto, only it has come to seem to me a 
very comforting one. Our demands, especially our emotional demands, are easily 
changed. That hope and belief we are deprived of are not necessary for us; we can 
substitute something else for them. Belief in God and in the monstrous importance 
of our own condition is rather a source of unhappiness and unhealthy strain than 
of consolation. The one consolation is the “vanitas”— the voice of judgment 
crying “All’s well” through the dark silence following the extinction of the world. 
All is finite, all is to end, all is bearable—that is our comfort. And while it lasts, we 
can enjoy what we find to enjoy, running our scales as merrily as possible between 
hunger and satiety. We are souls bereaved, to be sure, but we can be easily 
comforted. Off with the old love and on with the new, if you have any sap in you. 
If you haven’t, of course you will mope and whine, and lament the loss of your 
first and only love. As for me, I confess I am happier without religion of the 
optimistic sort—the belief in a Providence working for the best. Disbelief leaves 
one freer to love the good and hate the bad. . . .  
But while I say that I get on better with this new love . . . why should I 
 6 
insult my old love and call her a whore fit only for sailors and drunken knaves? 
That is what you want me to do. The fact is Christianity is still a possible system, 
seeing that intelligent men are still able to believe it. If you or I are not able, what 
a piece of foolish arrogance it is in us to vituperate those fortunate mortels whose 
mental kalleidoscope still presents the old and beautiful pattern. And how vain it is 
to wish to disturb them, when we know that the least shock will destroy that 
vision, and that probably we may turn and turn forever without finding it again. 
The trouble with you, my dear fellow, is that you are still a dogmatist, and believe 
that nobody has a right to have a picture different from yours. This seems to me 
the vainest of all superstitions. . . . (To Henry Ward Abbot, 23 March 1887)  
In a subsequent letter to the same friend Santayana declares his naturalistic allegiances 
and exhibits ideas that he would develop in important works over thirty years later, namely his 
notion of the natural and practical convictions that all actual human reasoning presupposes, 
which he would come to call animal faith. He wrote: 
As a matter of fact, I agree with you that Christianity is becoming 
untenable, because the firm and unshakable convictions in our minds are no 
longer Christian doctrines, but scientific ones. . . . There are certain convictions 
which cannot be exiled from the mind, convictions about everyday practical 
matters, about history, and about the ordinary passions of men. A system starting 
from these universal convictions has a foothold in every mind, and can coerce that 
mind to accept at least some of its content. The same is not true of systems 
founded on extraordinary and exceptional experiences, because these simply may 
cease to exist, in which case the system loses its hold. This is what is happening to 
Christianity. So I should say that the criterion by which one system is judged to be 
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more tenable than another is not logic but necessity—not the greater 
reasonableness of believing its facts but the greater impossibility of disbelieving 
them. (To Henry Ward Abbot 23 April 1887)  
These letters exhibit Santayana's lifelong resistance to coercive conformity and what he 
would call, in a philosophical sense, egotism. Another aspect of this resistance appears in a letter 
written thirty years later to his former student at Harvard, the American journalist, author, and 
activist, Max Eastman. Santayana was responding to Eastman after receiving copies of his 
literary journal The Masses. This letter explaining Santayana's views on freedom and social 
change exhibits the same honesty of opinion as his letters to his college friend. 
It is a pleasure to know that you still remember me and to see, by the two 
numbers of “Masses” which arrived this morning, what interests occupy your 
thoughts and those of your friends. It would be an ill return on my part if I 
deceived you about my feelings. Let me say frankly, therefore, that you must not 
send me your review; it would be wasted on me, if you wish to do missionary 
work, and it would not increase the sympathy which I naturally feel for any effort 
to free human life from unnecessary trammels, and to let youth have its say.  
Theoretically I admit the right of every individual to make what 
experiments he will, and nothing seems to me sacred merely because it exists and 
is habitual. In that sense, I am as radical a revolutionist as any of you: but the 
question is, in any particular case: Is this possible; and if it is possible is it worth 
while? Human life is not a product of reason but of natural, biological forces: we 
have to accept and use the organisms that grow up, including our bodies and their 
various propensities; and we deceive ourselves if we imagine that our criticisms 
and rebellions are anything but the expression of partial natural movements 
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within us, quite coordinate with those we oppose, and not one whit more 
authoritative.  
The question is simply what values our animal or social habit will create in 
comparison with another. And here my judgment probably differs entirely from 
yours. I am not sure whether The Masses represents one of the classes—the most 
numerous—or rather a few independent and exceptional individuals. In either 
case it would not represent the principal values which life in our time can possess. 
Consciousness must not quarrel with its instruments: and as its instruments in 
other ages have been religious or family institutions, so today they are nations and 
corporations and scientific bodies—and the press too, no doubt: and if you 
cultivate ill-will and bitterness—as you do—towards the best things which are 
possible for us in these times—gallantry, disillusion, courage to face the real world 
and heartiness in enjoying what is to be enjoyed in it—you are wasting your only 
true opportunities. You are also closing your heart to the only sweet and 
voluminous human sympathies which you could have shared: you are spoiling life 
for others and for yourselves in the very ignorant and very factious pursuit of some 
inopportune ideal. Not that I blame anybody for having the passions he has: only, 
if these passions are narrow and hopeless, I am very sorry for him. I know as well 
as anyone what it is to tread the wine-press alone; but why should a man who 
suffers from injustice be himself unjust? If you are incapable of loving what other 
people love, why should you hate it and hate them? It is an illusory revenge, by 
which nobody can gain anything.   Yours very truly   GSantayana (To Max 
Forrester Eastman 18 July 1917)  
The letter perhaps takes on additional significance when one recalls that Eastman the 
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youthful leftist later became an outspoken anti-communist and rejected his Marxist views. 
Santayana's views, as he remarked more than once in letters and published works, remained 
constant throughout his life though the mode of expression may have varied. The present letter 
shows the consistency of his materialist philosophy with his social views and cultural observations. 
He made such observation in other letters including one to an admirer in 1934. Santayana wrote, 
“The mediocrity of everything in the great world of today is simply appalling. We live in 
intellectual slums” (To Victor Wolfgang von Hagen, 6 November 1934).  
But, as I claimed earlier, his disillusion was not nihilistic. In a 1937 letter to an 
unidentified individual named Richard Cheney Santayana wrote, "The age is not intellectual, 
but the human race is capable of becoming so, and ought not to be ashamed of the fact" (To 
Richard Cheney, 1 June 1937). Around the same time to his Harvard classmates on the occasion 
of the 50th anniversary of their graduation he wrote that, “On the whole the world has seemed to 
me to move in the direction of light and reason, not that reason can ever govern human affairs, 
but that illusions and besetting passions may recede from the minds of men and allow reason to 
shine there.” (To the Class of 1886, May or June 1936)  
The contemporary relevance of Santayana’s philosophy becomes clearer if one has 
chosen reason and intelligence in response to popular notions of post-modernism, to social 
fragmentation, and to globalization. Santayana’s broadly humanistic philosophy not only 
respects but draws heavily on established cultural traditions while acknowledging the lack of 
universal hegemony of any one tradition. His outlook is unmistakably grounded in European 
culture, in the English language, the Greek philosophical tradition, and the Roman Catholic 
religious tradition. But his thought also displays a deep appreciation for Asian philosophical and 
religious traditions both as contrast and compliment to his European roots. Furthermore, 
Santayana was irreducibly influenced by his American experience—an experience of conflicted 
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allegiances that often provoked his best literary and philosophical writing. Out of this cultural 
material Santayana creates a philosophy that is both open to the variety of human experience 
and faithful to the concrete individual.  
Nevertheless, the cultural pluralism I attribute to Santayana’s philosophy is the product of 
a man with prejudices that are sometimes politely identified as those of his class and time. The 
letters sometimes display an insensitivity (though not a blithe dismissal) of racial conflict in the 
United States, and the philosophical and cultural critique of Judaism found in his published work 
is sometimes supplemented with unkind remarks about Jews in his letters. But the Letters also 
contain this 1926 response to an offer to be president of the Ayran Society: 
Against whom is the Aryan Society directed? Against the Arabians, the 
Jews, the Chinese, and the blameless Ethiopians? I confess that I don’t like the 
Jewish spirit, because it is worldly, seeing God in thrift and success, and I know 
nothing of the blacks; but the Arabs and the Chinese seem to me in some ways, 
apart from the costume, nearer to the Greeks than we are in Europe and America: 
they have taken the measure of life more sanely. Might it not turn out, then, that 
the Aryan Society, if it stood for the life of reason, was especially directed against 
the Aryans? Races, like nations, seem an unfortunate class of units to identify with 
moral ideas. If you had called your Society the Society for the Preservation of 
Traditions, or the Lawgivers Club, or something indicating the love of order as 
against the thirst for chaos, I might, as far as my sympathies are concerned, have 
been heartily with you: but even then, not as President. Even in the same church 
some are born to be monks and others to be bishops: I was born to be a monk. 
(Letter to John Jay Chapman 23 September 1926)  
In times of rapid social and technological change and accompanying cultural uncertainty, 
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Santayana’s philosophy is a serious and cheerful alternative to various forms of irrationalism like 
the fundamentalism, fanaticism, denial, or shallow relativism that seem to threaten intellectual 
life from all sides. Santayana’s philosophy values the richest fruits of social life such as religion, 
art, and science; but it never ignores the tragic nature of individual human existence and the 
unavoidable loss and limitation of being mortal. He could write of the eternal without resort to 
illusion or mysticism. Santayana's response to a friend after the death of her son shows how the 
honesty and humanity of his philosophy live together:  
[...] We have no claim to any of our possessions. We have no claim to exist; 
and, as we have to die in the end, so we must resign ourselves to die piecemeal, 
which really happens when we lose somebody or something that was closely 
intertwined with our existence. It is like a physical wound; we may survive, but 
maimed and broken in that direction; dead there. Not that we can, or ever do at 
heart, renounce our affections. Never that. We cannot exercise our full nature all 
at once in every direction; but the parts that are relatively in abeyance, their 
centre lying perhaps in the past or the future, belong to us inalienably. We should 
not be ourselves if we cancelled them. I don’t know how literally you may believe 
in another world, or whether the idea means very much to you. As you know, I 
am not myself a believer in the ordinary sense, yet my feeling on this subject is like 
that of believers, and not at all like that of my fellow-materialists. The reason is 
that I disagree utterly with that modern philosophy which regards experience as 
fundamental. Experience is a mere whiff or rumble, produced by enormously 
complex and ill-deciphered causes of experience; and in the other direction, 
experience is a mere peephole through which glimpses come down to us of eternal 
things. These are the only things that, in so far as we are spiritual beings, we can 
 12 
find or can love at all. All our affections, when clear and pure and not claims to 
possession, transport us to another world; and the loss of contact, here or there, 
with those eternal beings is merely like closing a book which we keep at hand for 
another occasion. We know that book by heart. Its verses give life to life.  
I don’t mean that these abstract considerations ought to console us. Why 
wish to be consoled? On the contrary, I wish to mourn perpetually the absence of 
what I love or might love. Isn’t that what religious people call the love of God? 
(To Iris Cutting Origo, May 1933)  
Santayana acknowledged the conflicted nature of human experience, but also imagined in detail 
the harmony of a life of reason and the unassailable freedom available to the human spirit. 
Santayana’s philosophy is materialism without reductionism and idealism without fanaticism. 
The letters attest to the sincerity of his vision and commitment to a philosophical life. 
